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Companies spend billions to promote their brand. But with increased trademark 
recognition comes the possibility of losing exclusive rights to use that trademark through 
a process called genericide. In determining whether a trademark has become generic, 
courts have often turned to linguistic evidence such as dictionaries and media usage. These 
courts suggest that linguistic tools reflect a trademark’s meaning. These tools are not the 
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objective indicators that courts have assumed, however. This Paper discusses why using 
dictionaries and media usage to prove genericide is a mistake and then turns to evaluating 
another interpretive tool, corpus linguistics. Corpus linguistics, unlike other linguistic 
tools, may prove beneficial for companies seeking to protect their trademarks. Ultimately, 
however, linguistic tools—including dictionaries, media usage, and corpus linguistics—
cannot prove genericism because linguistic data may, at best, prove a term’s majority 
usage. This is because the Lanham Act requires a showing of primary significance. This 
Paper contends that courts should maintain majority usage and primary significance as 
distinct concepts and, in this way, should reclaim the primary significance test.
I. INTRODUCTION
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????????
a trademark becomes, the more valuable the brand. When consumers purchase an Apple 
computer, their purchasing decision is driven in part by both emotional and logical factors 
???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
embodies the goodwill that companies have developed over time. Since many consumers 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
stands at an estimated $170 billion.2 Google and Microsoft would suffer losses of $101.8 
billion and $87 billion, respectively, if they were to lose complete control over their brand 
names.3 And since Forbes recently estimated that the ten most valuable trademarks are 
worth a combined $706.3 billion, it is unsurprising that some companies spend billions of 
dollars a year promoting and protecting their brand names.4
But with increased trademark recognition comes the increased chance that a 
company loses control of its trademark through genericide, a process by which the mark 
becomes the commonly used word for a general product or service. For instance, when 
Google filed for its initial public offering, some wondered whether the term Google would 
someday become synonymous with performing an online search???????????????????????????
??? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ???????5 These fears were not without 
foundation. Google has indeed been forced to fend off genericism claims in order to protect 
its trademark rights.6 If Google loses its trademark protection because the public 
                                                          
 2. Kurt Badenhausen, Apple Heads the World’s Most Valuable Brands of 2017 at $170 Billion, FORBES
(May 27, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2017/05/23/apple-heads-the-worlds-most-
valuable-brands-of-2017-at-170-billion. 
3. Id.
4. Id. 
 5. Sean Stonefield, The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks, FORBES (June 15, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/seanstonefield/2011/06/15/the-10-most-valuable-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
parent company, Alphabet, is vigorously defending the mark from genericide and noted its optimism that Google 
wil?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
still fighting to protect its brand. A federal appeals court affirmed the Google trademark this month, ruling the 
brand name was worth protecting in a case from 2012 involving cybersquatting of 763 domain names with the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????Badenhausen, supra note 2. 
6. See Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (D. Ariz. 2014). Google need not worry about genericide 
??? ???? ?????? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????? ????????? ????????? ?? ????????? ?????? ????????? ????? ??????????? ?????????
distinctiveness as a mark. Judge Richard ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2
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expropriates the term Google ??? ??????????????????????????????? the trademark will join 
a long list of other marks that have suffered the same fate, including Murphy Bed, 
Thermos, Trampoline, Escalator, and Aspirin. Moreover, once a term has become generic, 
a company cannot salvage its trademark from the public domain without overcoming the 
colossal burden of proving that the generic usage has become nearly obsolete.7 Given the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ?????????? ??? ??? ???????? ??????8 courts ought to carefully scrutinize the types of 
evidence they find persuasive in proving genericism. 
All too often, they have not. The legal test for genericide requires the challenging 
??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
mark describes a class of products rather than a particular product made by the trademark 
holder.9 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the name of the 
???????????????????????as the name of the product itself and the common name of all 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
In applying this test, courts frequently turn to linguistic tools to determine whether 
the generic sense of a mark has supplanted its trademarked meaning. For instance, the 
Second Circuit, in declaring the term Murphy Bed ???????????????????????and allowing a 
competitor to use the term freely?relied almost entirely on dictionary entries and uses of 
the term in newspapers and magazines.10 More recently, the Seventh Circuit credited 
evidence showing generic uses of the term Beanie in newspapers, and a federal district 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????11
Courts have not paused to consider the wisdom of relying on this kind of linguistic 
?????? ????????? ??????????????? ????? ?????? ?????? ????? ???????????? ???????? ????? ???????? ????
???????? ????????? ??????????? ??? ?? ??????? ???????? ??? ?????????????12 Instead, courts 
depend on dictionaries and media usage to fin the true meaning of trademarks, reverencing 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????13 And, because scholars have not 
????????????????????? ??????????? ?????? ???????????????????? ???????????????????????? ??????????
linguistic evidence for establishing facts that linguistic tools are not capable of proving. 
Dictionaries, for one, cannot prove that a well-known trademark has become 
generic. A dictionary cannot and does not claim to reveal the primary significance of a 
word in the minds of consumers.  Dictionaries are useful only to determine the range of 
possible meanings of a trademark. Thus, a dictionary may reasonably demonstrate that 
                                                          
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 7. In re Minnetonka, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q 772, *9 (T.T.A.B. 1981). 
 8. ???????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); Colt Def. LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 10. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989). 
11. Ty Inc??????????????????? ????????????????????? ????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1170?71. 
12. Murphy Door Bed, 874 F.2d at 101. 
 13. RANDOLPH QUIRK, STYLE AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 86 (1982); Stephen C. 
Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain 
Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1915?16 (2010) [hereinafter Definitional Fallacies???????????????????????????
the reverence with which society regards its dictionaries?a reverence that often borders on the ??????????????
3
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some segment of the public uses the mark generically in some circumstances. But using 
dictionaries to prove broader claims, such as the primary significance of a term, gravely 
misunderstands how dictionaries are compiled and organized. 
Using examples of the term in newspapers and magazines proves only slightly more 
useful than dictionaries. Presented with this evidence, courts may view actual instances of 
media usage?without having to rely on the value judgments of the lexicographers who 
compile dictionaries. But this type of analysis is methodologically unsound. Without a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the term is predominately generic. In the end, isolated media uses verify only that a 
generic sense to a trademarked term is linguistically possible?that some writers or editors 
use the term generically some of the time. That a generic sense is linguistically permissible, 
????????? ????????? ?????? ????? ???????????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ???? ??????? ????????????
meaning as the majority usage of a term. 
A third tool, corpus linguistics, offers a promising alternative to these tools. This 
method uses a computer database (a corpus) composed of naturally occurring words in 
context. In this respect, a corpus, like the Corpus of Contemporary American English 
(COCA) with ?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????14 Corpus linguistic data avoids many of the problems inherent in other linguistic 
tools, such as dictionaries and isolated media uses, because a corpus analysis provides an 
empirical approach to determine majority usage.15
This Paper evaluates the utility of corpus linguistics in genericide disputes and 
concludes that, although the tool provides a useful alternative to dictionaries and media 
examples and is capable of rebutting allegations of genericism. 
Corpus linguistics, however, suffers from the same fatal flaw as the other linguistic 
tools when employed to prove genericism. Linguistic data can show, at best, majority 
usage, the way most consumers use the term most of the time. When courts rely on 
linguistic data, therefore, they are using majority use a proxy for primary significance, the 
actual legal standard. A proxy, however, is suitable only as far as it accurately shadows 
the concept it purports to predict. Majority usage of a mark in speech and writing, often 
expressed in casual, non-purchasing situations, does not accurately reflect how the public 
perceives the mark?as either a source-identifying feature of a specific product or the 
                                                          
 14. Ben Zimmer, The Corpus in the Courts, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/03/the-corpus-in-the-court-like-lexis-on-steroids/72054/. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ng dependent on the vagaries of language, have 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. 
 15. The use of corpus data in legal disputes is a developing field, and courts have begun using corpus data to 
determine the ordinary meaning of words in statutory texts. See State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Utah 
2015) (Lee, J., concurring); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 849 (Mich. 2016); In re Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-aided searches 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????f examples than [judges] can summon 
??? ??????? ??? ???????? ????? Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1271 (Lee, J., concurring). Unsurprisingly, trademark 
litigators are also becoming aware of this new linguistic tool. In a recent court battle between Apple and 
Microsoft, the two companies hired competing linguists as expert witnesses who employed the COCA to analyze 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? See Expert Report of Robert A. Leonard in support of Apple, 
Inc., Microsoft Corp. v. Apple, Inc., (Opp. No. 91195582) (T.T.A.B. 2007); Expert Report of Ronald R. Butters 
in support of Microsoft, Microsoft Corp. v. Apple, Inc. (Opp. No. 91195582) (T.T.A.B. 2007). Apple also used 
the COCA in a similar suit against Amazon. Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Apple, Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CV11-01327-PJH 2011 WL 2461075 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2011). 
4
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common name of a general product. Because serious conceptual problems arise when 
courts use majority usage as a proxy for primary significance, courts should give little 
weight to linguistic tools when used to prove genericide, thereby reclaiming the primary 
significance test. 
Part II of this Paper introduces trademarks and genericide, briefly explaining the 
policy rationales behind genericide. Part III lays out how litigants and courts have 
traditionally proven genericide?including the use of dictionaries, magazines, and 
newspapers?and proceeds to point out the flaws unique to these methods. Part III 
introduces corpus linguistics and shows how its use may resolve many of the issues 
inherent in other methods. Part IV demonstrates the use of corpus linguistics by analyzing 
COCA searches for Xerox, Crock-Pot, Band-Aid, and Kleenex, trademarks that have 
recently flirted with genericide. The Part continues by analyzing the data and showing that 
corpus data may help to combat allegations of genericide (defensive use) but not to prove 
genericide (offensive use). Shifting to linguistic evidence generally, Part V will examine 
how linguistic data?including dictionaries, media usage, and corpus linguistics?cannot 
prove genericide because the ultimate inquiry rests on how consumers perceive a particular 
trademark. 
II. TRADEMARKS AND GENERICIDE
A. Scope of Trademark Law 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
from those of others. These devices generally consist of words, phrases, or symbols, 
though the Lanham A??????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????????? ?????
may, under certain circumstances, shelter indicators as broad as colors and scents.16 For 
?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
arches, Ronald McDonald, its slogan, and many other devices that serve to distinguish the 
fast food chain from other companies. Despite the broad nature of trademark protection, 
this Paper focuses entirely on trademarks comprising words or phrases because, first, 
genericide befalls word marks almost exclusively, and second, the benefits and limits of 
corpus linguistics apply only to word marks.17
Trademark law, in its true form, seeks to protect both the producer and the consumer. 
In enacting the Lanham Act, Congress set out in a committee report at least two purposes 
??????? ?????????????????????????? ?????????????????? ???????????? ??????????? ??? ??????????
                                                          
16. ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????tomatically receive a trademark if it falls within this definition. To 
register a trademark, the owner must also prove to the United State Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Id.; see 
also In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the company could 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ??????????????
product); In re Clark?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
floral scent of sewing thread because fragrance could serve a source-identifying function). 
 17. It should be noted that it is conceptually possible for other marks, such as symbols or colors, to undergo 
genericide. However, the genericide process would almost certainly come because a mark owner ceased to police 
its mark rather than because the public appropriated the mark by using it generically. 
5
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confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably 
knows, it will get the produc???????? ??? ????? ?????????????? ????????18 Second, Congress 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????-mark has spent energy, time, and money 
in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its 
misappropriation by pirat???????????????19 Trademarks, therefore, protect both consumers 
???? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ?????? ????? ????? ???? ?????
significant investment. 
??????? ??????????? ??????? ?????????? ??????????? ??????? ??????????? ??????????
trademark law?often based in economic efficiency. One such benefit lies in reduced 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the more competitive the 
market??20 When consumers recognize trademarks, it signals to them a familiar product 
????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to purchase. Consumers also benefit because trademarks encourage producers to maintain 
a consistently high-quality product line because trademarks evoke in the consumer 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????21 ????????????????????????????????????????
level of quality, or reduces quality below what consumers expect from earlier experience, 
?????????????????????????????????????????22
Not all marks, however, receive protection. Trademark protection only follows 
distinctive marks, meaning marks that are capable of identifying to consumers a specific 
source rather than a category of pro????????????? ?? ??????????? ???????? ??????????????
????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ????????? ????????????? ?? ???????? ???? ???????? ????????? ????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
term does not serve a source-identifying function. 
Marks generally fall into one of five categories?generic, descriptive, suggestive, 
arbitrary, and fanciful?along a scale, traditionally termed the Abercrombie spectrum.23 A 
generic mark is one often used as the name for a type of good. A producer may not claim 
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????genus ??? ?????????????????? ??????????
                                                          
 18. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). 
19. Id.
 20. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting ????? ????? ????y
identifying the source of the goods, [trademarks] convey valuable information to consumers at lower costs . . . A 
trademark also may induce the supplier of goods to make higher quality products and to adhere to a consistent 
level of quality???
21. See id. at 1430 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the consumers, they respond by devaluing the trademark. The existence of this hostage gives the seller another 
incentive to afford consume????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
22. Id.
23. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (1976). Judge Friendly is credited 
with cogently explaining the different types of possible terms. He wrote ????????????????????????????????????
which roughly reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these classes 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. But Judge Friendly also noted 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . the difficulties are compounded because a 
term that is in one category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for another, because a term 
may shift from one category to another in light of differences in usage through time, because a term may have 
one meaning to one group of users and a different one to others, and because the same term may be put to different 
????????????????????????????????????????Id. (footnotes omitted). 
6
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product is a species??????????24 Producers cannot receive trademark protection for generic 
terms because allowing one producer exclusive rights over a generic term would 
essentially eliminate from the market a term competitors need to sell their own goods, 
effectively creating a monopoly. 
Descriptive marks prove more distinctive than generic ones, though they merely 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????25 One court 
noted that a descriptive mark?such as After-Tan, for post-tanning lotion; 5-Minute Glue, 
for quick acting glue; and Yellow Pages, for a telephone directory???????????????????a
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????26 Since descriptive 
marks are not inherently distinctive, failing to immediately serve a source-identifying 
function, a descriptive mark may not receive immediate trademark protection.27 A party 
seeking trademark protection must show secondary meaning?????????? ??????????by long 
use with a particular product, come to be known by the public as specifically designating 
??????????????28 Thus, by requiring producers with descriptive marks to prove a level of 
public familiarity with the mark before seeking protection, the secondary meaning doctrine 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
significance . . . in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the 
??????????29
The final three categories of marks are deemed inherently distinctive?protection 
attaches immediately without a showing of secondary meaning. The first, a suggestive 
mark, resembles a descriptive mark but suggests rather than describes the product or its 
characteristics.30 ????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
requires a certain amount of imagination to deduce the exact nature of the goods.31 Oft-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????32
Although suggestive terms are descriptive in ????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ????? ?????? ?? ???????????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ????? ????
??????????? ???????? ??? ??????? ???????? ??????? ?????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ???
                                                          
 24. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 516 (2015). 
25. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 (quoting Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 295 
F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
 26. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e). 
 28. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Richkard, 492 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1974). In Subsection (f), 
the Lanham Act codifies the necessity of showing secondary mea???????????????????????????????????????????????
chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the 
??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
 29. ?????????????????????????????????????? ??????1, 118 (1938). 
 30. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 24, at 513?14. Suggestive marks were not originally recognized at common 
law. Courts developed the doctrine because, at early common law, descriptive marks were not capable of 
receiving trademark protection and ??????? ???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
avoiding denying trademark protection to marks that were only somewhat descriptive, courts categorized these 
??????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 513; see Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10. 
 31. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 24, at 513?14; Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 747 F.2d 358, 
362 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 32. ??????????l Bank of TX ?????????????l Bank of TX, 909 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining the 
Abercrombie spectrum and giving examples); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106 
(2d Cir. 1976). 
7
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ascertaining the nature of the products that th???????????????????33
Arbitrary and fanciful marks, the final two categories and the strongest marks in 
terms of distinctiveness, often get lumped together. However, the two categories are easily 
distinguishable, and the distinction can have legal consequences.34 Arbitrary marks use 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
denotes a pomaceous fruit and the name of a multinational technology company. Apple 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
relation to genuine fruit products. Alternatively, fanciful marks consist of newly coined 
words that have no ordinary meaning beyond that of a source identifier. Common 
examples include Xerox, Polaroid, and Exxon.35
When a company holds a valid trademark, which necessarily falls within one of the 
protectable categories, it may police its trademark to ensure no one appropriates the 
mark???????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???????? ??? ????????? ???? ????? ???????? ?????????
association.36 If a court finds trademark infringement or dilution, the court will enjoin the 
infringing party from further use of the mark and may hold them responsible to pay 
damages. Since trademarks prove tremendously valuable to companies, potentially 
including the goodwill created by billions of dollars of advertising, many companies 
vigorously police their trademarks to protect their name, reputation, and market share. 
Yet, an enforceable trademark will not always maintain its protected status because 
some terms do not remain source indicative. As Judge Friendly explained in Abercrombie 
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????gory 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????37 A mark may lose its trademark 
status by shifting from being protectable?being descriptive (with secondary meaning), 
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful?to being generic, a process called genericide. 
Genericide primarily occurs under two circumstances: a product comes on the market that 
has no generic name, such as cellophane, which began as a trademark for transparent sheets 
made of regenerated cellulose, owned by Dupont Cellophane Company; or a trademark 
becomes so well known (usually as the leader in the industry) that the public begins to 
substitute the trademark name for the generic name, as happened with aspirin and 
escalator.38 Thus, the public becomes unaware that the name refers to a specific product 
                                                          
33. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-???????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ????????????? ???? ?????????????????
explanation of suggestive marks implies a higher standard than most courts would require, it nonetheless 
illustrates the concept of suggestive marks. 
 34. Apple is arbitrary for computers but generic for fruit. Thus, in the rare event that the owner of an arbitrary 
mark expanded into a product market where the mark was generic, trademark protection would not extend to 
products sold in that market. 
 35. Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 624 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125. While any owner of a valid trademark may sue to enjoin the use of a confusingly 
similar mark, only widely recognized marks have a cause of action for dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
37. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (1976). 
 38. See Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug 
Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). In holding Aspirin to be generic, Judge Learned Hand acknowledged the 
difficulty of the question before him:  
If the defendant is allowed to continue the use of the word of the first class [Aspirin], certainly without 
any condition, there is a chance that it may get customers away from the plaintiff by deception. On 
the other hand, if the plaintiff is allowed a monopoly of the word as against consumers, it will deprive 
the defendant, and the trade in general, of the right effectually to dispose of the drug by the only 
8
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or company and begins to use the trademark generically to refer to a broader class of goods 
or services.   
B. Genericide 
Generic terms belong in the public domain and receive no trademark protection 
regardless of whether a mark began as a generic term, never receiving trademark 
protection, or a once-distinctive mark slowly became a generic term. Once a term enters 
the public domain, it can never serve as a protectable trademark.39 However, the Patent 
and Trademark Office refusing to register a generic mark differs from a court declaring a 
popular brand name generic. The former prohibits a producer from enforcing its mark from 
the outset, often before much expenditure, but the latter potentially negates billions of 
dollars of advertising and the goodwill associated with a deliberately crafted reputation. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
making the trad?????? ?? ?????????? ??????40 Additionally, discarding a once-strong 
?????????? ????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ??????????????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????41
However, when a trademark truly becomes generic, powerful policy considerations 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ??????????????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ????????????
without using the ?????????????????????????????????????????????????42 Sellers would find it 
extremely difficult to market an escalator, a thermos, or a yo-yo without using those 
terms.43 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
no other words could be used to denote these products, but . . . if no other words have
emerged as synonyms it may be difficult for a seller forbidden to use [a trademark] to 
????????????????????????????????????????44 While some courts may imprudently cancel 
a trademark prematurely, most scholars would agree that genericide has its place when 
protecting a generic mark would amount to conferring a monopoly on one producer, most 
                                                          
description which will be understood.  
Bayer Co., 272 F. at 513?14. 
39. See ????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????c term cannot be appropriated from the public domain and thus cannot receive trademark 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
generic name . . . is irretrievably in the public domain, and the preservation of competition precludes its 
??????????????
40. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
41. Id. (asserting that if even ten percent of consumers continued to associate the trademark with a specific 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??? ??? ?????????? ???????????? The successors to Noah Webster produced the most recognized 
??????????? ????????????????? ??? ???? ???????????????????????????? ???? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????
because the public began to associate the term with dictionaries generally. However, consumers still, a century 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ??????-??????????
42. Id.
43. See id. at 532?33. 
44. Id. at 532. 
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often the most well-known seller.45 Since Congress never designed trademarks to be as 
broad as property rights, avoiding monopolies and other policy considerations require 
trademark owners to lose protection when their marks become generic.46
III. TRADITIONAL LINGUISTIC TOOLS FOR PROVING GENERICIDE
Parties challenging a trademark as generic have often relied on linguistic materials 
to establish genericness, including dictionary entries and print sources such as newspapers 
and magazines. Courts have found these sources persuasive because they reflect public 
usage or are themselves actual examples of usage. However, dictionaries and media usage 
are not the objective indicators that courts have at times assumed. 
A. Dictionaries 
Courts routinely  look to dictionaries to determine whether a term has become 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????47 In Murphy Bed??????????????????????? ??? ????????
trademark had become generic be?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ????
dictionaries as a standard description of a wall-?????48 The court considered this significant 
????????????????????????????????????????????49
Courts find dictionary evidence persuasive because they consider lexicographers 
???? ?????? ??????????? ???????? ???? ???????????? ??? ?? ??????? ????????50 For instance, one 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
dictionary makers find, in the objective data of everyday speech and published writing, 
widespread use of well-known brand names in a fashion that has technical earmarks of 
                                                          
45. See Vincent N. Palladino, Genericism Rationalized: Another View, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 469, 471 (2000) 
(arguing that trademark law needs more stringent standards to protect against unwarranted genericide but also 
conced?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to use in order to compete in a market for goods or services, irrespective of what purpose trademarks once served, 
now serve or may someday come to ?????????WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
a generic name would be described as a product monopoly but is more accurately a language monopoly. Unless 
the owner of the generic name were the lowest-cost producer . . . he would license the use of the name to 
???????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ?????????? ????????? J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:2 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
generic name of a product would be equivalent to creating a monopoly in that particular product, something that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 46. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 45, at 193???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
denying protection to generic terms is slight and almost certainly outweighed by the benefits from pitching a 
trademark into the public domain when it becomes generic. For this reduces the costs of communication by 
making it cheaper for competitors of the (former) trademark owner to inform the consumer that they are selling 
????????????????????
47. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989). 
48. Id.
 49. Courts often cite to the influential treatise on trademarks, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, for the 
proposition that dictionary entries are persuasive evidence that a term is generic. See MCCARTHY, supra note 45, 
at § 12:13. 
50. Trademarks in Dictionaries, 59 TRADEMARK REP?? ????? ???? ??????? ????????????? ?Trademarks in 
Dictionaries???
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?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????51 Thus, many 
in the legal profession trust that, given dictionari???? ????????? ??? ?????????? ?????????
????????????? ????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ??????????? ??? ?? ??????? ???????? ???? ????
????????????????????52
Despite the idyllic nature of this account, the narrative does not accurately portray 
the pitfalls inherent in using dictionary definitions to prove genericide.53 Although lawyers 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
compilation ??? ?? ?????????? ?????? ??????????54 As Professor Lawrence Solan has 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and we speak as though there were only one dictionary, whose lexicographer got all the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????55 Thus, dictionary users should note, 
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????56
Additionally, several considerations should cause a court to hesitate before resorting 
to the dictionary to prove the primary significance of a term in the minds of the public. 
First, the materials that lexicographers use to compile dictionaries come from outside the 
editorial o????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????57 This creates a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????58 Professional linguists, potentially because of their fondness for language, 
                                                          
 51. Ronald R. Butters, A Linguistic Look at Trademark Dilution, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 507, 511?12 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 52. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 53. This Paper does not address the use of dictionaries to show that the term is generic prior to the use of a 
mark, only the use of dictionaries to show that by its own influence a well-known mark turned generic. While 
many of the same arguments against the use of dictionaries could be shown, using dictionaries to show that a 
????? ???? ??????? ????? ???????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??????? ????? ?????? ????? ??? ????? ????? ?? ??????? ?????????
significance in the minds ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to inherently generic trademarks. See Christian Sci. Bd. Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Evans, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????cognized that there are two types of generic words or 
terms: those that are inherently generic, and those that originated as trademarks but through usage suffered the 
loss of their distinctive sense, characteristic, or meaning. . . . The [1984] Lanham Act amendments dealt only 
???????????????????
 54. Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13, at 1915; Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the 
Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
d????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
Use The Dictionary]. For a more general critique of the use of dictionaries in legal analysis, see also Craig 
Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts,
6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL?Y 401 (2003); Jason Weinstein, Against Dictionaries: Using Analogical 
Reasoning to Achieve a More Restrained Textualism, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 649, 663 (2005). 
 55. Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, supra note 54, at 50. 
 56. ?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
entry at face value is in effect adopting the lexicographical judgment as its own, even though such a judgment 
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????) (citation omitted). 
57. Trademarks in Dictionaries, supra note 50, at 738 (remarks by a lexicographer regarding how his team 
creates a dictionary). 
 58. DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD & RANDI REPPEN, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE 
STRUCTURE AND USE 3 (1998). 
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also tend to observe unique usages of a word more frequently than common ones.59 This 
could cause an overrepresentation of rare senses in the materials lexicographers have at 
their disposal, which could cause dictionaries to include a word sense that, in fact, has little 
significance to the general public. 
Second, the dubious inclusion of unique word senses in one dictionary could 
proliferate and spread through multiple dictionaries. Dictionary editors work mainly from 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
keep an eye on the competition. . . . We tend to look at competing dictionaries to make 
sure that we cover roughly wha??????????????60 While the lexicographer accurately noted 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
dictionary does ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????61 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
entirely independent in deciding to include a generic sense.62
Moreover, courts often employ dictionary entries to represent much broader 
principles than a dictionary, by its nature, may reliably represent. In the context of a 
genericism analysis, the Murphy Bed court contended, as near-conclusive proof, that since 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????
was met?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????roduct not the producer.63 Dictionaries, however, make no 
such claim.64 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
one depicting the trademark sense and another the generic sense, but most dictionaries 
make no claim as to which definition predominates. Dictionaries, and the lexicographers 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
although fitting within the literal definition, fail to capture the ordinary sense of the 
??????65 In other words, dictionaries put the most common definition of a term side-by-
side with the most atypical sense of the word, and the reader must deduce which is which 
through intuition. 
???????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ???? ?????????????? ???????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ????
                                                          
 59. J. Charles Alderson, Judging the Frequency of English Words, 28 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 383, 383 (2007) 
(???????? ?????? ???????????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ????????????? ??????????? ????? ??????????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
60. Trademarks in Dictionaries, supra note 50, at 738. 
61. Id.
62. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 63. Id. While the Murphy Bed ?????? ????? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ???????????? ???????????? ???? ????
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
court gave the dictionary entries near-conclusive effect. The primary significance test first appeared in Kellogg 
Co., 305 U.S. at 118. The Lanham Act of 1946 (as amended in 1984) codified the Kellogg formulation of the test 
??? ?????????? ?????????? ?????? ???????? ????????????? ??? ???? ???????????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????? ??????? ?????
purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name 
of goods ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 64. ???? ?????????????? ???? ?????? ???? ??????? ???????? ????????????? ??????? ???? ??? ????? ????? ????????????? ????
considered authorities. I think we shrink from this designation. We do not feel that we should always be 
?????????????????????????Trademarks in Dictionaries, supra note 50, at 743. 
65. The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361 (1998). 
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Supreme Court and relied upon in Murphy Bed, expressly disavows any reliance on its 
??????????? ??? ?????????? ?? ??????? ???????????? ????????? ???? ????????????? ?????????????
????????? ??????? ????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ???????? ???? ????? ?????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????66 ??????????? ???????????????-known dictionaries such as 
the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), orders its senses historically. Even with those 
dictionaries that claim to order word senses by statistical frequency?the most frequently 
used senses ranking at or near the top?the rankings are not particularly accurate.67 This 
makes it nearly impossible to tell from a dictionary definition which sen????????????????
???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????precisely the function courts suggest 
dictionaries can perform. 
Dictionaries prove a useful tool only for a much simpler purpose. This does not 
suggest that they are useless to the genericism analysis; for individual entries may show 
whether the public employs a trademarked term generically. As Professors Hart and Sacks 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . of the meanings with which 
words have in fact been used by writers of good repute. They are often useful in answering 
hard questions of whether, in an appropriate context, a particular meaning is linguistically
permissible??68 A court should welcome dictionary evidence to determine if a generic 
sense of a trademark term is linguistically permissible, but beyond this function the 
dictionary cannot yield reliable results.69
Yet, courts must do more than determine the linguistic permissibility of a generic 
sense. As Justice Scalia noted in a case involving statutory inte????????????????????????????
not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily
is ??????70 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the world of English usage to discover whether ?????????????????????? ????????71 ??????????
?????????????????????? . . the ordinary meaning??72 Similarly, a court facing a trademark 
dispute must determine more than how a word can be used. It must decide the primary 
significance of a trademarked term. And consulting dictionaries, while probative of 
                                                          
 66. WEBSTER?S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17a (1971). 
67. See Mouritsen, supra note 13, at 1935?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
word deal is that sense which suggests a particular amount: i.e., a great deal or good deal. This is true both in 
spoken English and in written texts. Thus, if the Random House [Dictionary] ranks its senses by statistical 
frequency as it claims, we would expect to find this sense listed first. In fact, this sense is listed twenty-?????????
 68. Id. at 1922. 
 69. It seems reasonable that a generic dictionary definition is fairly reliable evidence that at least some subset 
of the population uses the trademarked term in a generic sense. However, the opposite is not true. The absence 
of a generic definition is not conclusive evidence that a trademarked term is never used generically. See Door 
Sys., Inc. v. Pro-????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
up to date, or tracks the language of the marketplace perfectly. A number of generic terms are not found in 
??????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ??????????? ??????????? ???????? ?????????? ???????? ????? ??????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????k owner. 
See SIDNEY LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 406?09 (2d ed. 2001). 
 70. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (determining whether the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
crime). 
 71. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deciding whether the 1982 
amendment to the Voting Rights Act applied to judicial elections). 
72. Id.
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?????????????????????? ????? ?? ?????? ??? ???????? ????? ?????????????? ?????????????????????
????????????????????????????????73
B. Media Usage 
In addition to dictionary definitions, courts have often relied on other linguistic 
materials, namely examples of usage from newspapers, magazines, and, occasionally, 
trade journals (media usage).74 Parties challenging the distinctiveness of a trademarked 
term may introduce examples of print materials with the term used generically. The Second 
Circuit has gone so far as to declare that media usage?specifically newspaper and 
magazine usage??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
term has become generic.75 ?????????? ????? ?????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? and
????????????????????????????????????????????Murphy Bed court concluded that, paired with 
dictionary evidence, the primary significance of the term was necessarily generic.76
Although evidence of genericism may certainly come from newspapers and other 
print sources, the way parties present this evidence to courts is methodologically 
unsound.77 Courts must determine the primary significance of a term, but isolated 
?????????? ????? ?????????? ?????????? ????? ??????????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??????
much more than dictionary definitions?that the trademarked term has a genuine generic 
sense. It is a non-sequitur to conclude that since isolated generic usages exist, they must 
comprise the majority of uses. Nothing short of empirical evidence can establish that one 
usage appears more frequently than another, and in the absence of such empirical data, 
courts will be left solely to their own intuition to declare the victor. 
Leaving the primary significance determination to human intuition is an inequitable 
result, both to the losing party and to trademark policy. This is due to the unreliable nature 
of human intuition when determining the semantic sense other individuals use more 
commonly.78 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
only the vaguest notion of the frequency of a construct or a word . . . [t]here are certain 
??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????79 Thus, since 
?????????? ???????????? ???? ???? ???????????? ??? ????????? ???? ???????????????? ???????? ?????
presented with isolated examples of generic uses in newspapers and magazines, have no 
reasoned way of determining whether these examples represent a fringe usage or the 
primary significance.80 These empirical findings may only be achieved through direct 
evidence or empirical methods. 
                                                          
73. See id. ???????? ?????????????????? ????????????????? ????? ???? ????? ?? ??????????? ??? ??????? ????? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
74. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Nat’l Starch and Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (using uses 
of a term in newspaper articles to establish the genericness of a particular word); Birtcher Electro Med. Sys., Inc. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
jour???????????????????????????????????????
75. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989). 
  78.  Id. 
77. See infra Part IV. 
78. See Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13????????????????????????????????????the frequency of 
?????????????????????????????????????
 79. TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 15 (2d ed. 2003). 
80. Id.
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IV.  CORPUS LINGUISTICS
Unlike the qualitative methods of consulting dictionary definitions and analyzing 
isolated print sources, which merely offer proof of linguistic permissibility, the primary 
significance determination may, under certain circumstances, be enhanced by a 
quantitative analysis through a linguistic methodology called corpus linguistics.81 In 
general terms, corpus linguistics, through the review of collections of written and spoken 
language, facilitates the study of language function and use.82 The words in the corpus, an 
electronic database, occur naturally, meaning that they come from everyday uses of words 
in contexts such as literary fiction, newspapers, magazines, and academic journals. This 
gives insight into how the public actually uses language.83
This Paper uses the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) to illustrate 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-available corpus of English, 
and the only large and balanced corpus of A?????????????????84 The COCA documents 
roughly four million words used each year from 1990 to 2015 in each of five categories?
spoken, fiction, magazine, newspaper, and academic?for a total of nearly 534 million 
words.85 While the COCA may not appropriately represent the consuming public if 
consumers consist of a specialized group?perhaps professional buyers?courts 
traditionally assume that the consuming public includes the general public, reliably 
represented in the COCA.86
The COCA contains diverse tools for varying linguistic analyses, though this Section 
focuses on only a few features that assist in determining majority usage.87 First, the corpus 
                                                          
 81. Corpus linguistics is quantitative in nature in the sense that it allows the researcher to find a random 
sampling of a particular usage, find the most frequent collocates, and test for frequency. However, as discussed 
below, corpus linguistic data involves a qualitative component since much of the data must be qualitatively 
analyzed. 
 82. DOUGLAS BIBER, Corpus-based and Corpus-driven Analysis of Language Variation and Use, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 159 (Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog eds., 2009). 
83. See Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics As an Empirical 
Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 159 (2011) [hereinafter Hard Cases]. 
84. See CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH (COCA), http://corpus.byu.edu/coca. The COCA 
was created by Mark Davies, a professor of linguistics at Brigham Young University. BYU also maintains the 
Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) and the News on the Web Corpus (NOW), a continually 
updating database with nearly four billion words. Each of these corpora could potentially be useful in analyzing 
trademark issues. 
85. Id.
86. See, e.g????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ??????? See also,
MCCARTHY, supra note 45, at § 12:????????????????????????????????? . ???????????????????????????????????????
not to prof???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 87. Stephen Mouritsen provides a thorough overview of COCA in his article on corpus linguistics in statutory 
interpretation. See Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13, at 1956?98. Corpus linguistic analysis, in 
the context of a genericness determination, is similar to how some scholars and judge have begun to use corpus 
data in statutory interpretation. Scholars and judges have posited that corpus linguistics may be helpful to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????See Felix Frankfurter, Some 
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 527 (1947); Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies,
supra note 13; Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027 (2005) 
????????????????????????; Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 83. See also FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 
(2011); State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Utah 2015) ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
for real-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????In re Baby E.Z., 266 
P.3d 702, 724 n.21 (Utah 2011); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838 (Mich. 2016); ???????????????????????
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returns a random sampling of a particular word, avoiding claims of cherry-picking 
favorable examples from newspapers or magazines.88 The COCA contains 1197 instances 
of Xerox, and, by selecting this option, the corpus will display one hundred, two hundred, 
five hundred, or one thousand randomized instances of the word. Second, words in the 
corpus are tagged for grammatical content, which allows the user to search for and 
compare, for example, instances of Google, Skype, or Fed-Ex used as a verb versus a noun. 
While most genericide cases will analyze the uses of the trademarked term in all 
grammatical contexts, this feature may potentially be useful under specialized 
circumstances.89
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
over a certain span of time. Thus, if a party claims that a term has only been generic for 
the last ten years, results from years previous could be excluded to test the claim.90 This 
type of analysis would require more than skimming the corpus results, but the corpus data 
provides the springboard for a more comprehensive analysis. 
Fourth, a corpus search is arranged in concordance lines (also known as Key Word 
in Context (KWIC)), which allows the researcher to see each individual result in the 
context of its original sentence. The corpus also permits for an expanded view that lets the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
allows one to code the distinct usages of a trademarked term, distinguishing between 
generic senses and trade??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
like the Crock-???????????????????
Fifth, the COCA includes a simple tool to search for collocates, words most typically 
used with a particular term.91 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
between words.92 ???????????????????????????????????instances of all words occurring within 
a particular span, for example, four words to the left of the node word and four words to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????93 Unlike with concordance lines, 
the COCA reviews every instance of the target word to create a collocation list. A 
???????????? ????? ???? ?????????? ???????????????? ?????-cut to the information that could be 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????94 In the trademark context, collocations may prove useful in comparing 
                                                          
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????)
(citation omitted). In similar fashion, corpus linguistics may assist in determining how the consuming public uses 
trademarked terms. 
 88. The links to each COCA search may be easily saved and shared, so parties may verify the accuracy of 
the results and the interpretation of individual entries. 
89. See, e.g., Elliott v. Google Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting an argument that Google 
is generic because it is often used as a verb). 
 90. Though the corpus contains this feature, if the scope is too limited (for example, limiting the relevant 
period to five or ten years), the corpus may not contain enough examples to be helpful. 
 91. Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13, at 1962. 
92. Id.
 93. SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS 69 (2002). 
 94. Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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what words co-occur with the trademarked term versus the recognized generic term (e.g. 
Crock-Pot versus slow cooker) to confirm or reject that the terms are near synonyms and 
are often used in a similar manner. 
Sixth, the COCA allows a user to see the overall frequency of a word in the corpus. 
In other words, the corpus shows how frequently the word appears per one million words.95
While this indicator holds no significant meaning for other corpus analyses, since it often 
only matters how frequently a particular sense appears rather than how frequently the 
general word appears, in a genericide inquiry, it proves potentially relevant. For instance, 
the relative frequency of a trademarked term and its generic counterpart might evidence 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
not rely on the availability of alternative words to describe a product, if the public uses 
?????????????????????????-tipped applicat???? ????????????????????????????????????? -Tip, 
it might be probative that the trademark retains its distinctiveness.96 Such evidence could 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
already extracted from ????????????97
Through these tools, trademark owners and challengers alike may offer more robust 
arguments about how the consuming public uses the disputed term because corpus analysis 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? . .  is a more reliable guide to language 
???? ???????????????????? ???????????98 As Professor Lawrence Solan, one of the foremost 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
makes it relatively simple to see how words are used in commerce and in common 
??????????99???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
lexicographers. If they perform that task seriously, they stand to learn more about how 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????hting over which dictionary is the 
                                                          
corpus user in summarizing some of the information to be found in concordance lines, thereby allowing more 
instances of a w???????????????????????? . . Put simply, the collocation data will show the words that are most 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 95. The relative frequency is determined by dividing the total number of words in the corpus, currently 
533,788,932, by 1,000,000 (533.788932). Then, the total number of instances of the target word is divided by 
533.788932. The output is how frequently the word appears per million words in the corpus. 
96. See Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952) (since the public still used 
other generic terms such as medical swab and cotton-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
consumer the product double tipped applicator as distinguished from a certain brand appl??????????Dupont 
Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 75 (2d Cir. 1936);  (the availability of a generic name did not 
???????? ????????????? ??????????????????); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) 
(consumers knew the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????
97. See Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13, at 1963. 
 98. HUNSTON, supra ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
very much more language than is contained in even the largest corpus, much of that experience remains hidden 
????????????????????? Id. While the claim that native speakers have more language experience than the largest 
corpus may no longer be accurate (since some corpora now have billions of words), her observation that corpus 
linguistics is more reliable than intuition remains true. 
 99. New Text, supra note 87, at 2060. Professor Solan calls the use of quantitative methods like corpus 
???????????? ??? ?????????? ??????????????? ???? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????? ??????? ???? ???????????
methodology relies heavily on a vision of language that itself contains an enriched vision of context. In particular, 
it has replaced the plain meaning, dictionary approach to word meaning, with the ordinary meaning, probabilistic 
approach. The result is that it is possible to rely on language judgments alone for a great deal of context-sensitive 
???????????????????????Id.
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????? ???????????????100 Thus, a corpus may aid in quantitatively determining how the 
consuming public predominately uses a trademarked term and whether the public has 
appropriated the trademark to refer generically to the product itself. 
A. Corpus Searches and Results 
This Section provides four examples of trademarks that have flirted with genericism. 
The COCA searches show that corpus linguistics may prove probative for some marks?
providing significant evidence of trademarked usage for Xerox and Crock-Pot?but being 
almost neutral as to Band-Aid and Kleenex. This data, along with the theoretical discussion 
?????????? ??? ????? ???? ?????? ??????? ????????????? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ???
defending against and proving genericide. More specifically, the data shows that 
trademark owners could use corpus linguistics effectively to combat allegations of 
genericide. However, corpus data alone cannot prove genericide because, in many cases, 
trademarked and generic usages are indistinguishable. Additionally, a corpus analysis 
yields only examples of usage?at most proving majority usage?but cannot effectively 
prove the primary significance of a trademarked term in the minds of the consuming 
public. 
As noted in this Section, classifying uses of a term proves a difficult undertaking, so 
I offer some details on how I coded the individual instances into the categories of 
trademarked, generic, or ambiguous. While I make no claim to a generalized theory of 
how corpus data should be classified, I suggest a few general points on coding the data. 
First, capitalization does not necessarily indicate a specific classification. In standard 
English grammar, capital letters denote specific entities rather than common nouns,101 but 
this test does not hold true for trademarked terms. Although one expert witness in a 
trademark case attempted to classify trademarked uses in just such a way, explaining that 
??????????? ???? ???????? ???????? ???????? ????? ?????? ????? ?????????? ????? ?? ??????????? ????????
demonstrati??? ????? ???? ????? ????????? ??????? ??? ??? ??? ???????????? ??? ????? ????????102 that 
assertion in the trademark context is demonstrably false. In an age of automatic spell 
checkers that correct non-capitalized uses of recognized trademarks103?added to the fact 
that many publishers have style guides requiring authors to capitalize registered 
trademarks?trademark uses often resist traditional linguistic reasoning. 
Second, figurative senses are always generic uses of the term. A figurative sense is 
one that is not intended to be understood literally, deriving its metaphorical sense from an 
?????????? ????? ??? ???????? ??????????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ?????-????? ????? ???????????
??????????? ????????????? ???? ?????????? ?????-???? ???????????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ????
speaker may plausibly be aware that Johnson & Johnson produces the Band-Aid adhesive 
bandage, the references were necessarily to a metaphorical bandage and not to one 
                                                          
100. Id.
101. See RODNEY HUDDLESTON & GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, THE CAMBRIDGE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 1757?59 (2002). 
 102. Leonard, supra note 15. 
103. See Butters, supra note 51????????????????????????????? ???????? verb, on the other hand, would appear to 
be far more robust linguistic evidence that the user does not think of the term as a brand name but rather as a 
generic, even if (in this era of automatic spell-checks) the user capitalizes the term (e.g., Please Xerox this letter 
for me!)????
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produced by Johnson & Johnson.104 Corpus data cannot prove subjective intent, focusing 
entirely on measuring a ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????-????????????????????????????? ???? ??????? ????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ???????
corpus contains only usage, as discussed in Section IV, creates both the benefits and the 
limits of using corpus data in genericide cases. 
Third, in the face of two plausible interpretations, one generic and the other 
ambiguous, I conservatively coded the instance as generic. Similarly, only clearly 
trademarked senses were categorized as trademarked. For instance, I coded as generic 
????? ?????? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??? ??????because the 
??????? ????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ??? ?? ??????????? ?????itive, signifying the 
?????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ????????????despite the existence of alternative 
interpretations that could render the sentence ambiguous. Conservatively coding the data 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????many generic uses and few 
trademarked ones appear, corpus data alone cannot prove genericide. 
1. Xerox® 
Xerox Corporation, a Fortune 500 company best known for inventing the photocopy 
machine and laser printer, sells business services and document technology products.105 In 
2015, Xerox had $18 billion in revenue,106 which helps explain how the name Xerox has, 
in some quarters, become synonymous with photocopying. For example, the OED, after 
?????????????? ???? ???????????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ??? ???? ?eproduce by 
???????????? ??? ???????????107 As discussed above, this generic dictionary definition 
demonstrates fairly conclusively that the generic sense of Xerox remains linguistically 
possible; in other words, at least some members of the public use the term generically to 
refer to a photocopy or to the act of photocopying. However, the corpus data shows that 
Xerox leads as the strongest of the four marks discussed in this Section. Xerox has not 
legally genericized; meaning, the primary significance of Xerox in the minds of the 
consuming public remains the trademarked sense. 
From the 1197 instances of Xerox in the COCA, I analyzed a random sample of one 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
For example, one ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
photocopy?the output of a Xerox product?rather than a Xerox photocopy machine or 
printer. 
                                                          
104. See ???????????????????????????????., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (reasoning that a term is trademarked 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 105. ???????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ???? ?ts model 914 photocopier, released in 1959. See EVA HEMMUNGS 
WRITEN, NO TRESPASSING: AUTHORSHIP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BOUNDARIES OF 
GLOBALIZATION 61 (2004). Since that time it is has become one of the leading companies for photocopiers and 
related products. 
 106. Letter from Ursula M. Burns, CEO, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, to Shareholders, 
https://www.xerox.com/annual-report-2015/shareholder-letter.html.
107. Xerox, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/231014?rskey=p6q9Qs&result 
=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited June 9, 2018). 
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Although seven percent of the sampled instances were generic, seventy-five percent, 
were specific to Xerox Corporation. In other words, the reference invoked the specific 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in ???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????-specific reference. Xerox receives a leg-up in this 
regard because, unlike many marks, the trademark doubles as the name of the corporation; 
accordingly, many media mentions involve direct references to the corporation. While this 
cannot save all trademarks, in this case references to Xerox Corporation and Xerox-
manufactured equipment show that seventy-five percent of the time the public encounters 
a reference to Xerox, the usage refers to its trademarked sense. 
The remaining eighteen percent of instances were ambiguous. Sentences such as, 
??????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
be coded. This example could mean either: 1) he had a conversation over the Xerox-
manufactured copy machine or 2) he had a conversation over the (generic) photocopier. 
Without additional evidence about whether Xerox in fact made the machine, it is nearly 
impossible to say for certain which of the two meanings is correct. This is similar to 
??????????????? ????? ?? ??????? ?????? ????? ???????? ???? ??????? ????108 A recent court 
?????????????????????????? ????? ???? ????????????????????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ???????????
searching ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
searching on the internet using any ???????????????109 The court was highly skeptical that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????re
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
usage. 
2. Crock-Pot® 
Crock-Pot is the original and most successful brand of slow cookers. Indeed, Crock-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????k-??????????????????????????????????????
The Rival Company acquired a little-known company that manufactured the Bean Pot, and 
in 1971, Rival reintroduced the product as the Crock-Pot.110 Currently, the trademark is 
owned by Newell Brands, which also owns other successful brands such as Coleman, 
Rubbermaid, Graco, and Yankee Candle. In 2014, the company sold 4.4 million Crock-
Pots,111 and the brand accounts for as much as eighty percent of the slow cooker market.112
After reviewing the concordance lines or KWIC, I found that twenty instances of 
Crock-????????????????????????????????? ??? ???? ??????????????????????????????????????????
recent weeks, I have used my Crock-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????ate an awareness of the particular brand. 
                                                          
108. See Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1165 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
109. Id. at 1173???? ????? ?????? ?????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ????? ????? ??ct that a majority of the public 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
 110. Funding Universe, The Rival Company History, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/the-rival-company-history/. 
 111. Sam Sifton, The Slow Cooker, Redeemed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/18/dining/the-slow-cooker-redeemed.html. 
 112. Mark Bittman, Slow and Low is the Way to Go, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2003), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/29/dining/slow-and-low-is-the-way-to-go.html. 
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Only four instances were sufficiently suggestive of genericness to warrant coding as a 
????????????????????????????????? ???????????-??????????????????????????????????????
an instance of metonymy, references the cuisine rather than the slow cooker that prepared 
it.
Finally, a full seventy six percent of instances were ambiguous; namely, the 
examples do not indicate whether the person meant a Crock-Pot slow cooker or referenced 
Crock-Pot merely as a generic label for ??????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
she went to work, Sophia would put supper in the Crock-???????????????????????????????
indication that the person meant an original Crock-Pot, but given that a sizable majority 
of slow cookers in the United States are the original, it is just as likely that the slow cooker 
was in fact a Crock-Pot and the speaker specifically invoked the brand. 
The collocation list, reproduced in Figure 1, suggests some intriguing patterns. First, 
the most common collocates for Crock-????????????????????????????its generic name. 
This confirms the findings in the concordance lines and the dictionary definition113 that 
Crock-Pot and slow cooker are closely related synonyms. Second, slow cooker is used 
more frequently in careful writing such as recipes (giving instructions about the size of 
slow cooker to use and directing how to cook the food), while Crock-Pot is used more 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????114  Crock-Pot is also used more frequently to refer to specific types of slow 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
Fig. 1 
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??????????????
                                                          
 113. Crock-Pot, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/44653?redirectedFrom=cr 
ock-pot#eid7825720 (last visited June 9, 2018). ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????ctrical 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id.
 114. ???????????????????????????????????????????? ????-Pot could be more prevalent in speech and slow cooker 
more prevalent in writing, the data did not show any significant difference between speech and writing. 
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Another telling data point is the relative frequency of the words Crock-Pot and its 
generic counterpart, slow cooker. Crock-Pot occurs in the corpus at a frequency of .2 
words per one million while slow cooker occurs at .78 words per one million, almost four 
times more often. While this data alone does not preclude a finding of genericism115 (since 
the Lanham Act sanctions only the primary significance test), the finding reveals that 
Crock-Pot, by its popularity, has not replaced its generic name.116 Consumers seem either 
to be aware of the Crock-Pot brand or to use slow cooker synonymously with but much 
more frequently than the trademarked name. 
3. Band-Aid® 
Band-Aid is a registered trademark of Johnson & Johnson, one of the largest 
companies in the United States. While the company retains its trademark, the public has 
long used Band-Aid to refer to an adhesive bandage generally or even figuratively to refer 
to patching up a problem. The OED acknowledges the proprietary sense of the word but 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????117 A review of the 
COCA confirms that Band-Aid is indeed used generically more often than either Xerox or 
Crock-Pot. 
Only three instances of Band-Aid were clearly used in the trademarked sense. These 
referred to specific types of Band-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ????????? ?????????????????? ??????? percent of occurrences are clearly generic usages, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-????????????????????
????????? ??????? ????? ??????? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?????? ???? ????? ???????? ??????????? ???
suggesting some band-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of occurrences were ambiguous, being unclear whether the references indicated a Band-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????kle 
of blood seeps from under his Band-????????????????????????????????????????????
The collocates for Band-Aid confirm the results from the concordance lines. The top 
collocate for Band-?????????????????????????????????????-six times, and each instance of 
?????-?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????-??????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
 115. Some scholars have argued that the test for genericism should be tied to the effects on competition. See, 
e.g., John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868 
(1984). While the effects-on-competition test is not currently the legal standard?and the arguments for and 
against such a test are outside the scope of this Paper?corpus linguistics could prove effective in applying this 
test becau????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for Crock-Pot. 
 116. The Lanham Act allows only for the primary significance test, but this does not make the existence of 
alternative words irrelevant. Since the dominate justification for trademark rights is reduced search costs, the fact 
that competitors have alternative words to describe their products is likely significant to many courts. See Mark 
P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. ??????? ??????? ???????
would be nearly impossible to overstate the extent to which the search costs theory now dominates as the
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????A Search-
Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223 (2007) (remarking that courts 
and scholars generally endorse the search-costs theory and noting that search-cost justifications often limit 
trademark rights in underappreciated ways). 
117. Band-Aid, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15126?rskey=AtlRTB&res 
ult=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited June 9, 2018). 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? the results 
for the singular and plural (e.g. solution + solutions), the figurative results are even more 
salient, as represented in Figure 2. 
Fig. 2 
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First, the collocates suggest that the term has a generic meaning because the word 
Band-Aid often occurs with words implying a figurative sense. Second, the remaining 
??????????? ????????? ????? ?????-????? ???? ?????????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ????? ???????
speakers use bandage in more contexts than Band-Aid. Both terms occur regularly in the 
context of dressing wounds with various types of coverings. 
The relative frequency of the two terms also provides insight into how consumers 
may use Band-Aid and bandage. Band-Aid occurs 567 times in the COCA, which is a 
frequency of 1.06 words per one million. Bandage occurs in 1160 instances, or 2.17 words 
per one million, more than double Band-?????? ???????????????? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ??
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
therefore likely to occur more frequently), but the data suggests that Band-Aid has not 
replaced the word bandage in public usage.  Consumers seem to be aware that Band-Aid 
is a brand or to use bandage synonymously with the trademarked name. 
4. Kleenex® 
Kimberly-Clark Corporation introduced Kleenex brand facial tissue nearly a century 
ago as a cold cream remover, but it quickly became a disposable substitute for the 
handkerchief.119 It has remained the dominant brand of facial tissues and accounts for 
                                                          
 118. ???????????-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 119. Andrew Adam Newman, Researching the Sneeze and How to Handle It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/business/media/researching-the-sneeze-and-how-to-handle-it.html. 
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almost fifty percent of the facial tissue market.120
A review of the COCA concordance lines shows that Kleenex is the weakest brand, 
in the sense that the data rarely clearly shows the term being used as a protected trademark. 
Merely six instances (six percent) were unambiguously trademarked uses. One sentence 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
four trademarks in this Section, Kleenex also had the fewest instances of plainly generic 
uses?two ????????? ???? ???????? ???? ??????? ????? ?anamanian people have sometimes 
????????? ??? ???? ???????? ???????????? ?????????? ????? ???? ???????? ????????? ????? ????
overwhelming majority of occurrences, 90 percent, were ambiguous. Examples such as 
????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????? ???? ???? ????? ????? ?? ????????? ?????? refer to a facial tissue 
generally or to a Kleenex brand tissue. The remaining two instances of Kleenex were not 
related to facial tissue (one referencing a start-up band called Kleenex), and are not 
relevant to the genericism inquiry. 
B. Analysis of Corpus Data 
Overall, the corpus data adds support to the theory that linguistic evidence alone 
cannot prove genericide. However, corpus linguistics, unlike dictionaries and isolated 
newspaper usage, may perform an important task?proving distinctiveness. In other 
words, corpus linguistics may provide an effective tool for companies with distinctive 
marks in combatting genericide claims. But, corpus data alone cannot prove genericide for 
two reasons: First, in practical terms, for some marks that have generic senses, it is nearly 
impossible to decipher the correct usage sense without additional extratextual evidence, 
something lacking in corpus data. Second, as discussed below, even where significant 
evidence of genericism exists, linguistic data only proves usage, not perception.121
The results from Band-Aid and Kleenex strongly suggest that corpus data cannot 
always prove effective because classification issues plague the inquiry. Some examples 
exhibit signs of genericness, but since the generic word often appears in the same 
context?????????????????????????????????????????????it is impossible to prove that the 
speaker in the first example is not asking for and expecting a genuine Kleenex. Thus, 
coding difficulties suggest that corpus data may not always demonstrate the genericness 
of a term, even when the public primarily uses the term generically. 
Yet, corpus linguistics is a promising tool for some marks that are used in contexts 
where the trademarked sense is easily identified. From the data, Xerox, for one, 
undoubtedly remains a trademark because a majority of the uses unambiguously referred 
to a source rather than a general product.122 During litigation, the trademark challenger 
would certainly produce dictionaries, like the OED, that demonstrate that Xerox has a 
generic sense. The challengers would also likely produce cherry-picked examples from 
newspapers and magazines from across the country that use Xerox generically. However, 
corpus data would show that Xerox is used in its trademarked sense 75 percent of the time. 
                                                          
120. Id.
121. See infra Part V. 
 122. The fact that Xerox is the name of the corporation?and many references refer directly or indirectly to 
the corporation rather than a specific product?does not change the analysis. The corpus data still shows that at 
least 75% of the time consumers come across the word Xerox, it is in the trademark sense. 
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Additionally, the corpus data would reveal only a limited number of instances where Xerox 
is unmistakably used generically. Xerox Corporation could persuasively refute its 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Similar themes emerge from a review of Crock-Pot, where there is a consequential, 
though not overwhelming, showing of trademarked uses but an almost non-existent 
showing of generic uses. Corpus data may not prove that Crock-Pot remains distinctive to 
the same degree as with Xerox, but the lack of clearly generic uses could effectively rebut 
any dictionary evidence to the contrary. 
Additionally, corpus linguistics may demonstrate the primary significance of a 
trademarked term when used defensively. As discussed in Part V, primary significance 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
genericness, corpus data cannot prove primary significance because corpus data only 
tracks usage. However, when a term is used in its trademarked sense, majority usage and 
primary significance are not entirely distinctive concepts. Persons may use Xerox 
generically?referring to a Xerox copy of a contract?but remain firmly aware of its 
trademarked significance. But the same person cannot use a term in its trademarked sense 
without being fully aware of its proprietary meaning. Thus, courts may use corpus data 
that supports trademarked usage because, unlike generic usage, such data is probative of 
the ultimate question of primary significance. 
V. MAJORITY USAGE VERSUS PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE
Since many uses of trademarked terms are ambiguous, attempting to show the most 
frequent use of a term?majority usage?may prove difficult as a practical matter. 
Additionally, as a legal matter, corpus data alone can never prove genericide because 
majority usage is not the legal test. Even if the corpus data unambiguously showed that 
?????????????????????-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
genericism analysis to usage. The Lanham Act expressly codifies the primary significance 
test.123 ????????????? ?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ??????????? ????? ??????including dictionary definitions, newspaper and 
magazine examples, and corpus linguistic data?cannot conclusively show how the public 
perceives a mark. This is so because linguistic data reflects usage. The legal test requires 
a showing of significance or perception. The primary significance test requires more than 
?????????????????????areness that a trademarked term refers to a specific producer, but the 
genericide doctrine also makes clear that consumers may view the trademark in more than 
one way?and use the mark accordingly. Otherwise, the primary significance test would 
shift to an absolute significance test. 
The history of the test for genericide bears out this distinction. In 1938, prior to the 
passage of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court announced its test for genericide. In 
                                                          
 123. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
services for which it is registered, a petition to cancel the registration for only those goods or services may be 
filed. A registered mark shall not be deemed to be the generic name of goods or services solely because such 
mark is also used as a name of or to identify a unique product or service. The primary significance of the 
registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether 
the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been 
use?????
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Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., the Court wrote that parties seeking to establish that 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in the minds of the consuming public ??? ???? ???? ???????? ???? ???? ??????????124 When 
Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946, it did not expressly sanction a genericide test 
and most courts continued to apply the primary significance test.125 However, in the early 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
test.126 This test was sharply criticized,127 and Congress acted quickly. In 1984 Congress 
amended the Lanham Act, codifying the primary significance test.128
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????Kellogg approach. The Lanham 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? ??? ????????????????????
rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered 
mark has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it 
???? ????? ??????129 Since the 1984 amendment, courts have recognized Kellogg as the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
adopted by the Supreme Court in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. and subsequently 
codified by Congress . . . ??130
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not totally clarified the standard, however. Courts and commentators often refer to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
inherently distinct concepts. Professor McCarthy, for instance, writes in his tremendously 
???????????? ????????? ????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ????? ???? ????? ?????????? ?????
inadvisably, however. Despite his pronouncement that majority usage satisfies the Lanham 
Act test, McCarthy also acknowledges that majority usage and primary significance are 
??????????????????? ??????????????????????????-purchasing uses of terms are not evidence of 
gene??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
uses in other contexts.131 ?? ??????? ???? ??????????? ?? ????? ??? ?? ?????????? ???? ?????
                                                          
124. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????19 (1938) (holding that National Biscuit Company 
??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????-??????????????????
(emphasis added). 
 125. MCCARTHY, supra note 45, at § 12:????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
 126. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1982). In Anti-
Monopoly, the Ninth Circuit sanctioned a survey that focused on the motivation of the consumer. It gave as an 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 1326. The court noted that 
???????????????????????????????????????? . . . We suspect that these results tend to show that the general public 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 1326. 
127. See Arthur J. Greenbaum, Jane C. Ginsburg & Steven M. Weinberg, A Proposal for Evaluating 
Genericism after Anti-Monopoly, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 101 (1983); Lester L. Hewitt & Paul E. Krieger, Anti-
Monopoly: An Autopsy for Trademarks, 11 A.P.L.A. Q.J. 151 (1983). 
 128. MCCARTHY, supra note 47, at § 12:????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
purchaser motivation test for genericness. In 1984, the Lanham Act was amended to codify the primary 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). 
130. Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 131. MCCARTHY, supra note 45, at § 12:8. 
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nevertheless employ it in a generic sense in casual conversation. It is the use and 
understanding of the term in the context of purchasing decisions, however, that determines 
???? ???????? ????????????? ??? ?? ?????????????132 But linguistic data from dictionaries, 
newspapers, magazines, and corpora usually provide just that?evidence of non-
purchasing, sometimes casual usage. 
???????? ???????????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ?? ??????? ?????????? ????????????? ?????
occasionally and under certain circumstances, use the term generically. This fact is 
?????????? ??? ???? ??????? ???? ?????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ????????????
trademark.133 In Haughton Elevator Company v. Seeberger, the PTO cancelled Otis 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
name to both the general public and to engineers and architects . . . .?134 The 
Co???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
occasion in its internal documents and advertising. The Commissioner noted that Otis used 
the term escalator in the same manner as it did elevator, a generic term, in advert????????????
???????????????????????????135 The PTO failed to recognize that usage and significance are 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
generic. 
But this case highlights the problems with considering usage and perception as 
parallel concepts. Otis Elevators might have used the term generically in its own internal 
documents and advertising, but the company certainly recognized the term as identifying 
a particular brand?its own. In other words, Otis employees who wrote the advertising 
material undoubtedly would have identified the trademarked sense of the term escalator as
their primary association, despite their own usage. And facing a purchasing decision, Otis 
employees surely would have distinguished between an Otis escalator and a competing 
product. 
Granted, escalator might have become a generic term by that point.136 But the PTO 
should not have relied on usage from actors that certainly distinguished its brand from 
others as dispositive evidence on the matter. Doing so only shows that it did not understand 
                                                          
 132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1995); MCCARTHY, supra
note 45, at § 15:??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????mark in a generic sense in casual 
conversation even though when questioned, those persons are fully aware of the trademark significance of the 
term. For example, persons may use Xerox or Kleenex in a generic sense . . . even though when going to purchase 
a photocopying machine or a box of tissues, they know that Xerox and Kleenex identify the commercial source 
of those products. Such casual, non-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
133. See Haughton Elevator, Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80, 1950 WL 4178, *1. The decision is lamentable 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
should clearly fail the primary significance test, but the Commissioner of Patents nevertheless cancelled Otis 
??????????????????????????????????????????
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id., at *2 ?????????????????? ?????? ????? ?????? ????? ???????? ????? ????????? ????????? ???????? ???? ????
???????????? ???????????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ?????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ??????? ????? ???? ???????????
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????ined as a moving inclined continuous stairway 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ???????
any indication that it designates origin of the type of device under consideration. It does not appear that any 
protest was made by the Otis Elevator Company or their representatives on the committee to the generic and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
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the distinction between usage and significance. If usage in any circumstance could show 
nothing about the primary significance of the term in the minds of the users, it was the 
evidence the PTO credited in this case. While the facts of this case likely occur rarely, it 
plainly shows how, logically, the concepts of majority usage and primary significance exist 
as distinct concepts. As such, courts should treat them as distinct concepts. 
Moreover, Congress recognized that the primary significance test would allow some 
?????????????????????????????????137 As one court note????????????????????????????????????
????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ??????? ???????? ???? ????? ??????? ?? ????????????? ??????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
indicating the genus of [goods or] services to wh?????????????????????????138 In Elliott v. 
Google, the court reasoned that the word Google, when used as a verb, could refer to using 
the Google search engine to perform an internet search or to using any search engine. The 
dual-function doctrine, however, suggests that it could mean both to the same person, 
depending on the circumstances. The inquiry remains which sense?the trademarked or 
the generic? ??????????????????????????????????????
The linguistic principles of semantic shift and semantic broadening confirm the dual-
function argument. The notion of semantic shift provides the foundation for the genericide 
doctrine. Words do not always retain their original meaning, adding new meanings and 
shedding archaic ones, resulting in the meaning of a word shifting so that its meaning 
differs from its original semantic sense.139 Thus, a trademarked term may undergo a shift 
from indicating a source to referring to a category of products, losing its original sense in 
the process. 
However, a word meaning may change without losing its original sense, a process 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ???????? ?????140 Simply because 
a trademarked term brings on a broader generic sense does not mean it loses its relevance 
to speakers of the language. The generic sense may overtake the trademarked one in the 
minds of the consumers, resulting in a loss of trademark rights, or the term could remain 
with two senses indefinitely. In this circumstance, the court must determine which sense 
predominates. 
Since a trademark may serve a dual function, courts should not look to linguistic 
data to prove the primary significance to consumers since a speaker may actively use a 
trademarked term generically while continuing to associate the term primarily with the 
trademark owner. In other words, courts should not confuse majority usage and primary 
significance. Relying solely on evidence of majority usage would amount to an 
abandonment of the prima?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Otis 
                                                          
137. See S. REP. NO. 98-627, 5 (1984), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5718, 5722. 
138. Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1162 (D. Ariz. 2014) (relying on statements from the Senate 
Report). 
 139. VICTORIA FROMKIN, ROBERT RODMAN & NINA HYAMS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 478 (8th ed. 
2007). 
140. Id. at 477; Ronald R. Butters & Jennifer Westerhaus, Linguistic Change in Words one owns: How 
Trademarks Become “Generic,” in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE II: UNFOLDING 
CONVERSATIONS ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of broadening, similar therefore to the process that has affected scores of English words?for example, dog,
which at one time referred to a specific kind of canis familiaris ??????????????????????????????????
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Elevator Co., when a court ties consumer perception to usage, it fails to take into account 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
establishing more than it is capable of proving. 
This is enhanced by the fact that when courts fail to distinguish between majority 
usage and primary significance, courts are often subverting the very policy goals upon 
which trademark law is built. In other words, if a majority of the public uses a trademarked 
term generically in non-??????????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ?? ???????????? ??????-
identifying function at the point of purchase, the policy rationales set forth by Congress 
and the academic literature would disfavor a finding of genericism. That is, the policy 
rationales for trademarks generally are in full force when the majority usage is generic but 
the primary significance of the term is the specific trademarked brand. 
This is illustrated by the policies Congress explained when it passed the Lanham 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will 
get the product which it asks ???????? ?????????????141 Trademark law was supposed to help 
distinguish products from one another. Consumers could rely, for instance, on getting 
genuine Kleenex brand tissues when the box includes the term Kleenex. 
But when competing companies are allowed to use the same term to identify their 
products, consumers who are unaware that the mark no longer performs a source-
????????????????????? ????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ???
?????142 As Judge Posner noted, discarding trademar????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ??????????????????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????143
????????? ???????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????-mark has spent 
energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his 
??????????? ????? ????????????????????? ??? ???????? ???? ????????144 Congress did not wish 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ipping the 
trademark owner of its rights when the mark reached the level of being a household name. 
If consumers still identify the mark with the brand and distinguish between the 
trademarked product and others at the point of the purchase, stripping trademark protection 
simply because the generic sense is the majority usage ?????? ????? ???????????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????145
This is valid especially with trademarks that gain enough popularity that the public 
                                                          
 141. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). 
142. See id.
143. ??? ????? ??? ???????????? ?????? ???? ????? ????? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ????? ??? ????? ???? ??????t of 
consumers continued to associate the trademark with a specific source it could lead to serious consumer 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
Dictionary. The successors to Noah Webster produced the most recognized dictionary for decades, but in the late 
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
term with dictionaries generally. However, consumers still, a century later, are confused about the issue, 
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ??????-??????????
 144. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, supra note 18, at 3. 
145. Ty Inc., 353 F.3d at 531. Judge Posner held that declaring a trademark generic should only occur when a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
brands cannot compete effectively ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. 
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begins to expropriate the trademark as the generic name. These companies often have spent 
years developing their brands and their product has become the most popular either 
because the trademark owner created the product or simply because the trademark owner 
created the best product. And for these efforts they should retain trademark protection for 
as long as consumers still identify the trademark with a specific product. 
And the policy rationales identified by courts and academics are similarly supported 
????? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ?? ????????????
brand-identifying function?despite majority usage being generic. First, when consumers 
still recognize the significance of a trademark, there is a reduction in consumer search 
??????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ???????? ??????????? ??????????? ??????? ???? ??????
consumers incur in searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the 
????????????????? ????????????146 Thus stripping trademark protection when consumers 
continue to rely on the mark?even when those same consumers use the term generically 
in non-purchasing scenarios?increases the transaction costs associated with buying a 
product. The signals consumers use to reduce their search costs (in deciding which product 
to purchase) will be absent because more than one product may bear the previously 
trademarked term. 
Second, a finding of genericism can disadvantage consumers because trademark 
owners will no longer have the same incentive to maintain a consistently high-quality 
product. Since trademarks identify a brand and encourage brand loyalty, which 
incentivizes the trademark owner to produce a consistent quality product, the trademark is 
a reflection of the pro???????????????????????????????147 But when other products can carry 
the same trademark that consumers once regarded as a mark of a certain quality, the 
producer no longer has the same incentives.148 Majority usage does not get to this problem. 
Only primary significance does. 
This policy rationale has no significance if consumers genuinely do not understand 
that a trademark functions as a source-identifying mark (because consumers are not 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????es not recognize 
the mark as identifying a single producer). But if consumers do associate a mark with its 
producer?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
use the term generically in non-purchasing situations?then stripping the protections 
trademarks enjoy can hurt consumers. This is because without trademark protection, the 
??????? ?????????????????? ??????????? ????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
                                                          
 146. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 ?????????? ?????? ???????? ????? ????? ????y
identifying the source of the goods, [trademarks] convey valuable information to consumers at lower costs. . . . 
A trademark also may induce the supplier of goods to make higher quality products and to adhere to a consistent 
???????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ????????????? ????? ???????? ?????????????
consumers; if the seller disappoints the consumers, they respond by devaluing the trademark. The existence of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Id. at 1430 (footnote omitted). But if other sellers disappoint consumers who associate a trademark with the 
original trademark owner, then the trademark is no longer hostage to the consumer and the incentives for high 
quality dissipate. 
147. See id. ?????????????????????????????????????ent level of quality, or reduces quality below what consumers 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 148. Granted, a company could recoup those losses and regain consumer loyalty if it can adequately distinguish 
itself ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
brand among various others that seem to be the same quality and bearing the same previously-trademarked term. 
30
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss3/5
2019] PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE TEST 437 
can produce a lower-quality product cheaper but still trade on the former trademark 
?????????????????????????????????
In addition, the policy goals behind the genericism doctrine are not supported when 
courts credit majority usage and ignore primary significance, except in a narrow 
circumstance. The policy undergirding the genericide doctrine is usually framed as an 
issue of competition. When the public no longer associates a trademark with a specific 
brand, then it would have anticompetitive effects on the market for one company to 
monopolize the market simply because it is the only company that can use the trademarked 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
difficult for a seller forbidden to use [a trademark] to communicate effectively with 
???????????149 In other words, as most scholars will concede, canceling a trademark 
because of genericism certainly has its place.150 And that place is when consumers 
genuinely no longer understand the source-identifying function a trademark performs. 
But unless there is no alternative generic form of the trademarked term, protecting a 
trademark does not confer a monopoly when consumers generally use the term generically 
in some circumstances but continue to recognize the mark as their primary association. 
And most trademarks have an additional generic form that competitors may use: Google 
(perform an online search), Kleenex (tissue), Xerox (photocopy), Crock-pot (slow cooker), 
and Band-Aid (bandage). Thus, when a court credits majority usage as controlling without 
ensuring that the primary significance of the term has also become generic, in each of the 
examples in this paper, the court would be stripping the trademark owner of protection 
without equal competitive benefits advancing the market generally. 
Granted, critics of distinguishing between majority usage and primary significance 
argue that majority usage is the only accurate proxy for actual knowledge. One scholar has 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
knows deep down that Xerox ?????????????????????????????????151 But the problem with 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
with subjective tests in various areas of the law; how can we ever really know what 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????152 He continues 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????153
????????????????????????????tique has merit, because subjective intent is difficult to 
                                                          
149. Ty Inc., 353 F.3d at 533 (emphasis deleted). 
150. See Vincent N. Palladino, Genericism Rationalized: Another View, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 469 (2000) 
(arguing that trademark law needs more stringent standards to protect against unwarranted genericide but also 
????????????????????????????????????rine prohibits exclusive appropriation by one party of a term that others need 
to use in order to compete in a market for goods or services, irrespective of what purpose trademarks once served, 
????????????????? ????????????? ??? ?????????WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
a generic name would be described as a product monopoly but is more accurately a language monopoly. Unless 
the owner of the generic name were the lowest-cost producer . . . he would license the use of the name to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????MCCARTHY, supra note 45, AT § 12:2 (4th ed.) 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????eneric name of a product would be equivalent to creating 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 151. Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 75, 103 (2014). 
152. Id.
153. Id.
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prove in any context, his argument misses the point for two reasons. First, courts should 
not discount usage as a means to proving primary significance because people might lie 
about how they use a particular term. Courts should not rely on majority usage because 
usage does not necessarily track knowledge. In other words, a proxy remains a useful 
concept only as far as it accurately reflects the concept it purports to predict. And majority 
usage has the potential to greatly underestimate the level of trademarked significance. 
???????????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
also refers to a brand.154 The Lanham Act requires more than mere awareness of the brand. 
The primary significance test is the statutory test precisely because consumers likely use 
a term generically, at least under certain circumstance, even when they associate the term 
predominately with a particular brand. Linguistic data cannot distinguish between those 
two instances. We do not expect people to lie. But we also do not expect people to always 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????y significance. 
?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ????????????? ???????????????????
?????? ???? ??? ????????? ???? ?? ??????????? ??????155 there are ways to determine primary 
significance without resorting to usage data. For instance, in Elliott, evidence from various 
surveys were introduced, and each survey gave consumers the chance to respond to how 
they ordinarily use Google as a verb, either to search for information using the Google 
search engine or using any search engine.156 The subjective intent problem is circumvented 
by allowing consumers to voice their perception of a term. While some proxy evidence 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
must accurately predict the primary significance.  Since linguistic evidence comes well 
equipped to determine majority usage but ill equipped to determine the significance of a 
term to the consuming public, majority usage proves a poor proxy. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Linguistic tools have the air of objectivity, and for this reason courts have often 
employed them to demonstrate that a once-recognized trademark has become generic. 
Dictionary entries especially are reverenced by some courts as the epitome of objectivity, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????ion of a trademarked term. Examples 
taken from newspapers and magazines have also persuaded courts that a term has lost its 
distinctiveness as a source-identifying mark. While courts ought to employ these linguistic 
tools to establish that the generic sense of a term is linguistically permissible, courts should 
not, as courts have previously done, use dictionary definitions and media usage to prove 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
Corpus linguistics, however, may prove more beneficial, especially to companies 
seeking to protect their trademarks. Trademark owners may show that in a random sample 
??? ?????????? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ????? ????????? ???? ????????????
proprietary sense. In this way, companies may show, despite the fact that dictionary 
definitions and media usage prove that the trademark has a generic sense, the primary 
                                                          
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1166?70 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
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significance of a term references the producer rather than a general product. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????rove a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Act, however, requires a showing of primary significance. Courts should maintain 
majority usage and primary significance as distinct concepts and, in this way, should 
reclaim the primary significance test. 
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